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Introduction
Helping between unrelated individuals remains a key
topic in evolutionary biology. From the point of view
of social evolution theory, helping unrelated individ-
uals and thereby increasing their direct fitness can
generally only be favoured by selection if it increases
the actors’ direct fitness as well (or e.g., in the case of
sterile workers, their relatives’ inclusive fitness
because of direct fitness benefits) (Lehmann & Keller
2006; West et al. 2007). We call such mutual direct
fitness benefits cooperation if it occurs within species
and mutualism if it occurs between species (Bshary &
Bergmu¨ller 2008). A wide diversity of ecological
parameters and cognitive mechanisms may promote
or hinder stable cooperation. For example, low mobil-
ity, long life or strong between-group competition
may facilitate stable cooperative behaviour (Lehmann
& Rousset 2010). So do the cognitive abilities to rec-
ognise individuals, to remember their behaviour in
the past interactions, and to show self-control to gain
future benefits that more than compensate for current
investment (Brosnan et al. 2010). Assumptions about
ecological variables and cognitive abilities are implic-
itly integrated in another major tool used to tackle
the issue of stable cooperative behaviour between
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Abstract
Recent years have seen an explosion in the diversity of partner control
mechanisms hypothesised to stabilise cooperative behaviour among
unrelated individuals. Game theory suggests numerous strategies, each
with specific decision rules that allow cooperators to control a non-con-
tributing partner. This diversity of hypothetical strategies seems likely to
reflect diversity in the types of intraspecific cooperation and interspecific
mutualism that exist in nature. It is therefore important to provide a
framework that explains similarities and differences between the various
hypothetical strategies and that predicts how key parameters that
describe the natural history of natural systems favour different control
mechanisms. We develop a novel unifying framework for pairwise inter-
actions between unrelated individuals, in which we link specific control
mechanisms to specific game structures. The latter are defined by
unique combinations of the states of five parameters that describe
investment, aspects of the payoff matrix, the number of interactions and
partner choice. We find that specific control mechanisms potentially
have utility in a limited number of game structures; conversely, each
game structure may typically offer a few competing control mechanisms.
Our framework offers theoreticians specific problems that await mathe-
matical exploration, while at the same time offering empiricists guide-
lines for evaluating the game structure and corresponding control
mechanisms in their systems.
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unrelated individuals: evolutionary game theory
(Maynard Smith 1982).
Although fully applicable to few real-life exam-
ples, the standard game theoretical model of cooper-
ation, the prisoner’s dilemma game (Luce & Raiffa
1957), highlights both the advantages and the pit-
falls of cooperative behaviour in many situations:
mutual cooperative behaviour yields higher payoffs
than mutual cheating, but cooperative behaviour
may be vulnerable to exploitation by non-coopera-
tive ‘cheaters’. Payoffs represent an immediate cost-
benefit analysis for alternative behavioural options.
Payoffs affect the individuals’ fitness by the sum of
the immediate payoff value and the effects of the
chosen behaviour on future payoffs because of its
influence on the future behaviour of partners (Bsh-
ary & Bergmu¨ller 2008). Most difficult to explain
are behaviours that increase the immediate payoff to
the recipient and decrease the immediate payoff to
the actor relative to alternative behavioural options.
We define such behaviours as ‘investments’. For any
investment, one must ask two related questions:
how does this investment yield future benefits to the
actor and hence an average net increase in inclusive
fitness, and how does selection maintain that level
of investment? While investments would appear to
make cooperative behaviour vulnerable to exploita-
tion, there is abundant evidence for cooperation and
mutualism in nature that are based on investment
by at least one partner (Bshary & Bronstein 2004;
Sachs et al. 2004). Mutualism involves players from
two gene pools, while cooperation involves players
from one gene pool. While this difference makes
conditions for stable mutualism less stringent than
for stable cooperation (everything else being equal,
Doebeli & Knowlton 1998; Bergstrom et al. 2003),
the game theoretical approach allows us to treat
them as a single problem in this article.
A first potential game theoretical solution for the
persistence of cooperation between unrelated indi-
viduals (both of the same and different species) was
provided by Axelrod & Hamilton (1981), who
explored Trivers’ verbal ideas on ‘reciprocal altruism’
(Trivers 1971) within an iterated version of the pris-
oner’s dilemma. They found that a simple strategy
called tit-for-tat emerged as a cooperative solution.
Tit-for-tat players first interact cooperatively then
copy the current behaviour of their partner in each
subsequent round. Tit-for tat players can therefore
reap the benefits of mutual cooperation when paired
with a cooperative partner, while avoiding strong
exploitation by an uncooperative partner. The con-
trolling aspect of the strategy, i.e., the mechanism
that causes cheating players to receive a lower total
payoff than cooperative players when paired with a
tit-for-tat player, is that only partners’ cooperative
behaviours are rewarded in the next round. There-
fore, tit-for-tat like strategies have been termed
‘positive reciprocity’ (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995).
More recently, a large variety of additional con-
cepts have been proposed to explain the evolution-
ary persistence of cooperation between pairs of
unrelated individuals, both within and between spe-
cies. These include by-product mutualism (Brown
1983), pseudoreciprocity (Connor 1986), indirect
reciprocity (Alexander 1987), threat of reciprocity
(Bshary & Bronstein 2004), parcelling (Connor
1995), punishment (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995),
sanctions (Herre et al. 1999), partner choice (Fer-
rie`re et al. 2002) and control over the duration of an
interaction (also called power) (Johnstone & Bshary
2002). There has been some confusion in the litera-
ture regarding the precise definitions of these con-
cepts and the extent to which they overlap (West
et al. 2007; Bergmu¨ller et al. 2007; Bshary & Berg-
mu¨ller 2008). Nevertheless, while few cases of coop-
eration have been properly explored within a game
theoretical framework, it appears that the most basic
concepts have their corresponding real-life counter-
parts (Bshary & Bergmu¨ller 2008). Therefore, ques-
tions arise about the relative importance of these
mechanisms in nature. Several authors have argued
that by-product mutualism and pseudoreciprocity
are bound to be widespread because of their evolu-
tionary stability, whereas any form of reciprocity
should be rare in comparison, as any benefit in reci-
procity is based on investment, constraining both its
evolution and stability (Leimar & Connor 2003;
Clutton-Brock 2009; Brosnan et al. 2010). However,
the relative importance of these mechanisms might
not hinge on evolutionary stability, but rather on
the strategic options available to potential coopera-
tors in nature. As we develop in this article, these
strategic options can be deduced from the structure
of the game that underlies the interaction.
The exercise should provide several important
insights. First, it causally links game structures and
control mechanisms in a single consistent frame-
work. Second, it generates clear and mutually exclu-
sive predictions about combinations of parameter
states (game structures) and corresponding control
mechanisms. Finally, it highlights key questions for
future studies of game structures that are compatible
with several alternative control mechanisms. Our
key aim is to encourage empiricists to use game the-
oretical thinking when studying cooperation their
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systems. Modelling cooperation has become a world
of its own, leading to many models that either seem
to apply very specifically to humans, or that go far
beyond the basic data that are still largely missing,
or that address technical aspects minimally linked to
real-life interactions. In 2009 alone, more than 50
theory papers on cooperation and altruism were
listed in Web of Science. We do not attempt to
review the theoretical literature. Instead, we focus
on what we consider a key interest for field biolo-
gists, namely how the presence or absence of basic
natural history parameters may affect cooperation.
Classification of the Various Concepts for
Cooperative Outcomes in 2-player Interactions
Before we introduce our key parameters, we will
briefly review the most basic concepts that have
been proposed to explain cooperation between two
unrelated individuals.
In response to confusion about the many game
theoretical concepts and corresponding terms, Bsh-
ary & Bergmu¨ller (2008) developed a simple classifi-
cation scheme that distinguishes nine major partner
control mechanisms that may underlie stable cooper-
ative behaviour. These mechanisms are characterised
by unique combinations of the states of four param-
eters, determined according to the answers to the
following questions. (1) Does the act of cooperating
require an investment? If there is no investment,
then there is no problem of cheating, so no partner
control is necessary (by-product mutualism; Brown
1983). If there is investment, one has to ask three
more questions. (2) Do the benefits of an investment
result from return investments (‘reciprocity’) or self-
serving actions (‘pseudoreciprocity’)? (3) Do the
benefits of an investment result from the behaviour
of the recipient (‘direct returns’) or from the behav-
iour of a third party (‘indirect returns’)? Finally, (4)
do the benefits of an investment result from a posi-
tive response of another individual, or from the
absence of a negative response of another individ-
ual? In all, this scheme produces by-product mutual-
ism and eight explanations for how investment in
cooperation may be stabilised (i.e., control mecha-
nisms): positive or negative, direct or indirect, reci-
procity or pseudoreciprocity (Bshary & Bergmu¨ller
2008). This classification scheme is illustrated in
Table 1, which also shows how concepts of coopera-
tion used in the literature can be defined using these
four parameters. For example, ‘punishment’ as
defined by Clutton-Brock & Parker (1995) is nega-
tive direct reciprocity, while ‘sanctions’ as used by
Herre et al. (1999) constitute negative direct pseu-
doreciprocity. Note, however, that other authors
have used the same terms in different ways.
A Decision Tree to Characterise Game Structures
in Cooperative Interactions
We restrict ourselves to an analysis of interactions
between two players. We extend an earlier study that
investigated game structures in mutualisms (Bshary
& Bronstein 2004), an approach that can easily be
applied to intraspecific cooperation as well. The game
structures can be described with a combination of
Table 1: Nine basic scenarios that may yield stable cooperation (net benefits to both players). The scenarios are described by unique combina-
tions of the variables ‘investment’ (yes or no), ‘costly return’ (yes or no), ‘returns from whom’ (recipient = direct; third party = indirect) and ‘nature
of benefit’ (reward = positive; avoidance of costs = negative). In the last column, we give names for the parameter combinations that fit definitions
found in the literature (though possibly used with different meanings as well) and in brackets our composed definitions
Investment Costly return Returns from whom Nature of benefit Terms from literature
No No investment ﬁ no
conditionality
– Own behaviour By-product mutualism
Yes No (by-product benefits) Recipient (direct) Reward (positive) Pseudoreciprocity (direct positive Pseudoreciprocity)
Yes No (by-product benefits) Recipient (direct) Avoidance of costs
(negative)
Pseudoreciprocity, Sanctions, Power (Direct negative
Pseudoreciprocity),
Yes No (by-product benefits) Third party (indirect) Reward (positive) Social prestige (Indirect positive Pseudoreciprocity)
Yes No (by-product benefits) Third party (indirect) Avoidance of costs
(negative)
Pay-to-stay (Indirect negative Pseudoreciprocity)
Yes Yes Recipient (direct) Reward (positive) Reciprocity, tit-for-tat, Pavlov (Direct positive reciprocity)
Yes Yes Recipient (direct) Avoidance of costs
(negative)
Punishment (Direct negative reciprocity)
Yes Yes Third party (indirect) Reward (positive) Indirect reciprocity (Indirect positive reciprocity)
Yes Yes Third party (indirect) Avoidance of costs
(negative)
Strong reciprocity, Policing (Indirect negative reciprocity)
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states of several parameters (Bshary & Bronstein
2004), five of which are relevant here for our main
analysis: (1) Investment: does one player, both play-
ers, or neither player invest in the interaction? (2)
Relative payoffs of cooperating and defecting: on
average, does cooperating yield a higher payoff than
defecting irrespective of the partner’s preferred
behaviour, or does the reverse apply? (3) Payoff sym-
metry: are the payoffs relatively symmetrical for both
players, or is there a strong asymmetry? (4) Number
of interactions: do partners interact only once or
repeatedly? (5) Partner choice options: does one,
both, or neither of the players have access to alterna-
tive partners? The resulting general framework for
game structures is best illustrated as a decision tree
with five steps, each representing the binary state of
one particular parameter (Fig. 1). We can then move
along the decision tree and ask, for each parameter
state combination, which strategies and their corre-
sponding control mechanisms could potentially pro-
mote cooperation.
It is important to note that there is a hierarchical
order in the five parameters we discuss, from most
basic to more specific. Sometimes, answers concern-
ing the states of more basic parameters make
answers to more specific parameter states irrelevant
in the sense that the latter do not have to be consid-
ered to understand how stable cooperation may be
achieved. The explanations will be given in the text,
while Fig. 1 illustrates what state combinations of
more basic parameters make the evaluation of more
specific parameter states irrelevant.
In an extension of our decision tree, we will then
introduce a sixth parameter, namely whether the
pairwise interaction takes place in the presence or
absence of a communication network. In a communi-
cation network, bystanders may eavesdrop on interac-
tions and use the gained information for behavioural
decisions in future interactions with previously
observed partners (McGregor 1993, 2005). Behavio-
ural decisions could therefore be guided by observa-
tions (‘information’, Roberts & Sherratt 2007) rather
than by personal experience.
The steps are explained in quite some detail, and
empirical examples are given as illustrations for
game structures and corresponding control mecha-
Fig. 1: A framework that defines various game structures of two-player interactions by the parameter states of the variables ‘investment’, ‘C,D’
(the relative payoffs of Cooperating or Defecting), payoff (rather symmetrical or rather asymmetrical), ‘n rounds’ (between the same two players,
one-off or repeated) and ‘partner choice’ (present or absent), and which links each game structure to specific partner control mechanisms. The
control mechanisms are defined in the text and Table 1. ‘Switching’: short hand for partner switching. TFT: tit-for-tat like reciprocity = direct posi-
tive reciprocity. GR, Generalised Reciprocity.
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nisms. Colleagues familiar with the field may find
the logic illustrated in Fig. 1 quite self-explanatory.
Step 1: Who Invests?
At this step, we distinguish among three scenarios:
either both partners, one partner or neither partner
invests, i.e., behaves such that their immediate pay-
off is reduced compared to alternative behaviours.
Some forms of cooperative behaviour involve no
investment at all. These behaviours increase the
actor’s immediate payoff and ultimately its direct fit-
ness relative to alternative behavioural options,
independently of the recipient’s behaviour. This con-
dition, in which cooperative behaviour is entirely
self-serving, has been termed by-product mutualism
(Brown 1983). Many authors have used the short-
hand ‘mutualism’ for this scenario, which is very
unfortunate given that this term has already been
defined in the 19th century as cooperation between
species (Bronstein 2003). Coordinated hunting by
pairs of jackals or between groupers and moray eels
provide good examples of by-product mutualism: if
both individuals cheat by not contributing to hunt-
ing, each receives no food. A single individual may
hunt successfully with low probability, while joint
hunting yields significantly increased hunting suc-
cess (Lamprecht 1978; Bshary et al. 2006). As
mutual cooperation is the best option for both play-
ers, it is not necessary to proceed any further on our
decision tree (Fig. 1); that is, we do not need to
know any further aspects of the game structure to
understand that by-product mutualism will be the
mechanism underlying stable cooperative behaviour.
Other interesting issues certainly remain: for exam-
ple, partner choice may still be important (Leimar &
Connor 2003), as one potential partner might pro-
vide higher by-product benefits than another. How-
ever, no partner control mechanism is needed to
ensure a positive payoff compared to the alternative
of not interacting, even if an individual is paired
with a low-quality partner. We do not consider this
form of cooperation further, focusing instead on
cases where cooperation involves an investment on
at least one side of the interaction.
If there is investment, one has to determine
whether one or both players invest. Unilateral
investment sets up an asymmetric situation in which
the partner that invests may be able to defect (i.e.,
to gain the benefit of cooperation while skipping the
investment). Bilateral investment, in turn, sets up a
symmetrical situation in which either partner can
defect.
Step 2: The Relationship Between Cooperating and
Defecting in the Behavioural Response to an
Investment
The second step in characterising the game structure
of a cooperative interaction is to assess how an invest-
ment may yield return benefits to the investor in the
future (Fig. 1). In one scenario, the investment leads
to a predictable, self-serving behaviour by the recipi-
ent or by a third party (e.g., an observer) that happens
to benefit the investor as a by-product of its actions. If
these by-product benefits are higher than the costs of
the investment, the game is classified as positive pseu-
doreciprocity (Table 1) (Connor 1986; Bshary & Berg-
mu¨ller 2008). A good empirical example is the
mutualism between leafcutter ants and fungi that
they ‘farm’ (i.e., cultivate and feed upon, Mueller
et al. 2005). Ants invest in this mutualism by provid-
ing leaves as a substrate for the fungi to grow upon
and by pruning pathogenic organisms from the fungal
colony. These behaviours allow the fungi to self-serv-
ingly grow healthy colonies in association with ants,
yielding by-product benefits to the ants as they har-
vest fungi for food. Because the fungi’s response to
the ants’ investment is self-serving, ‘C’ (the payoff
from cooperating, i.e., growing) is by definition larger
than ‘D’ (the payoff from defecting, i.e., not using the
ants’ help to grow). Therefore, investors (ants) do not
risk being cheated by the partners (fungi), as cheating
would be spiteful as defined by Hamilton (1964): it
would reduce the direct fitness of the fungi them-
selves. The evolutionary stability of positive pseudore-
ciprocity is easy to understand. As with by-product
mutualism, we need to proceed no further on the
decision tree (Fig. 1).
The issue of stability in cooperation and mutualism
becomes more complex as soon as there is investment
upon which at least one partner is tempted to cheat,
i.e., cases in which a reduction of investment would
be beneficial in the absence of retaliatory actions of
the partner. For example, a plant may benefit from
redirecting the resources necessary for nectar produc-
tion into growth or reproduction (Brandenburg et al.
2009), as long as the pollinators do not respond in a
way that reduces that plant’s fitness (e.g., by aban-
doning it). If pollinators do not discriminate between
cooperative plants (those providing normal nectar
quantities) and cheating ones (those providing
reduced nectar), cooperative plants lose in competi-
tion with cheaters. Therefore, for cooperation to
persist, pollinators must monitor the behaviour of
the plants, and partner control mechanisms such as
the power to terminate interactions with plants
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prematurely (Cresswell 1999) are expected that will
reduce plant cheaters’ fitness. In other words, partner
control mechanisms are retaliatory actions that
enforce investment.
Interactions with enforced investment can have
one of three combinations of payoffs for the two
players: (1) One player gains a higher payoff from
defecting on a cooperative partner, while the other
player’s best option is to cooperate as long its part-
ner cooperates; (2) both partners gain a higher pay-
off from defecting on a cooperative partner; or (3)
strategic options are asymmetric, in that one player
benefits from cheating while the other player lacks
any option to cheat its partner because it does not
invest in the partner. We will now separately
explore how these three states of parameter 2
(investment), in combination with the other param-
eters, influence the applicability of partner control
mechanisms.
Situation 1
We can denote the situation in which one player
gains a higher payoff from defecting on a coopera-
tive partner while the other player’s best option is to
cooperate as long its partner cooperates as ‘player 1:
DC > CC, player 2: CC > DC’, with DC standing for
Defecting on a Cooperating partner, and CC standing
for Cooperating with a Cooperative partner. Such a
situation might apply to interactions between the
cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus and predatory species
that solicit inspection (‘clients’). Cleaners remove
ectoparasites from other reef fish but prefer to eat
mucus (Grutter & Bshary 2003). This constitutes
cheating, as it is costly to the host compared to the
alternative of not interacting. In the absence of part-
ner control mechanisms, cleaners would therefore
be mucus-scraping cheaters rather than ectoparasite-
feeding mutualists (DC > CC). Conversely, Trivers
(1971) proposed that predatory clients benefit from
leaving cleaners alive instead of eating them because
the repeated benefits of having ectoparasites
removed are larger than the one-time benefit of
caloric intake through eating the cleaner (CC > DC).
We now explore steps 3–5 of our decision tree under
these payoff conditions.
Step 3: Payoff Asymmetries
Payoffs may often vary along a continuum. For sim-
plicity, however, we only deal with the two
extremes to introduce a binary choice in our deci-
sion tree. One extreme is that payoffs are very simi-
lar for both partners: e.g., if both cooperate, each
gains 10% of its daily energy requirements, whereas
if both cheat, each gains nothing. The other extreme
is that payoffs are very asymmetric: e.g., cheating by
one partner causes minor losses to the other, while
in the reverse case, the cheated individual loses its
life. Highly asymmetric payoffs are found in some
ant defence mutualisms, for example. In one well-
known case, ants tend aphids that produce nutrient-
rich excretions (honeydew). A cheating aphid would
be one that produced little, or less nutritious, honey-
dew; in contrast, an ant that cheated would be one
that consumed the aphid rather than tending it.
Under such asymmetric payoff conditions, stable
cooperative behaviour may be achieved if the player
that could kill its partner (the ant in this example) is
the one that receives a higher payoff if it cooperates
as long as its partner cooperates (CC > DC): an aphid
can be consumed only once, but the caloric gains
from doing so might soon be outweighed by the
repeated benefits of honeydew-feeding. Ant-defended
species would benefit from producing less honeydew
as long as ants cooperate (DC > CC). However, the
potential prey should behave cooperatively just
because of the ‘threat of reciprocity’ (Bshary & Bron-
stein 2004): if it cheated, it would have more
value as an immediate prey item, at which point
the predator would have effectively terminated the
game (Hammerstein & Hoekstra 1995). As a conse-
quence, predators do not have to hold their partners
in check. Therefore, no further information about
other parameters (n interactions, choice options) is
necessary to understand such interactions with
asymmetric payoffs. The threat of reciprocity may
promote stable cooperative behaviour under these
conditions.
If payoffs are more or less symmetrical without
threats to immediate survival from defection, further
information on the number of interactions and part-
ner choice is needed to assess how players may be
able to control their partner’s behaviour to make
them behave cooperatively.
Step 4: n Interactions
We distinguish between repeated interactions
between the same two players (typically viewed as a
game with a certain probability of having a next inter-
action (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981) and one-off (‘one
shot’) interactions. If interactions are one-off but the
payoffs are a function of the duration of an interac-
tion, then players may be able to terminate an inter-
action prematurely if the partner cheats. Under these
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conditions, control over the interaction’s duration,
termed ‘power’ in the economic literature (Bowles &
Hammerstein 2003), may be sufficient to promote a
cooperative outcome (Johnstone & Bshary 2002), if
the accumulation of cooperative benefits during a
prolonged interaction yields a higher total benefit
than a quick cheat. For example, non-predatory cli-
ents often terminate an interaction prematurely in
response to cheating by a cleaner fish (Bshary & Grut-
ter 2002), and cleaners cooperate more to avoid pre-
mature endings of interactions (Bshary & Grutter
2005). While the cleaner-non-predatory client inter-
actions provide a potential example for the use of
power, the strategic options for cleaners and clients
are asymmetric, as the non-predatory clients lack any
option to cheat cleaners. We do not know of an
example in which both partners invest, the payoffs
are such that ‘CC > DC’ applies to one player and
‘DC > CC’ to the other, the payoff consequences are
quite symmetrical, and individuals meet only once. If
such a game structure were found in nature, we pre-
dict that power would be the mechanism used to yield
stable cooperative behaviour.
If interactions are iterated, a further question is
whether players, in particular the individuals that
risk being cheated, can choose their partners.
Step 5: Partner Choice
Partner choice potentially exists if an individual may
select a partner from among two or more potential
partners. Partner choice has been identified as a
potentially important parameter for payoff distribu-
tion among partners in biological market theory (Noe¨
et al. 1991; Noe¨ & Hammerstein 1994). Biological
market theory views cooperation as an exchange of
goods or services between traders that typically
belong to two different classes, as defined by the prod-
uct they offer for exchange: nutrition for transport,
nutrition for protection, etc. (Bronstein 2001). If the
class of cooperators (CC > DC) is rare relative to the
class of potential defectors (DC > CC), the former
may choose among individuals belonging to the lat-
ter. As a consequence, cooperators may use a decision
rule such as ‘if the partner cooperates, then keep it,
but if the partner cheats then switch to a different
partner’. Cheaters would thus end up without a part-
ner. Several models show that the risk of losing a
partner may promote cooperative behaviour under
such conditions (Ferrie`re et al. 2002; McNamara et al.
2004; Foster & Wenseleers 2006; Johnstone & Bshary
2008). For example, individual ant-tended lycaenid
butterfly larvae may benefit from reducing the quan-
tity or quality of nutritional secretions they produce
for ants, as their production reduces fitness
(‘DC > CC’, Axe´n & Pierce 1998). While the ants have
an interest in protecting reward-producing larvae
from predators (‘CC > DC’), they are the mobile part-
ner with choice options. They can therefore leave any
larva that produces little or no substance and search
for more rewarding partners elsewhere. In conclu-
sion, partner switching provides a partner control
mechanism that can provide stable cooperative
behaviour in this particular game structure.
If there is no partner choice, then cooperators
may still be able to prevent potential defectors from
cheating in a repeated game if they are able to pun-
ish cheating of their partners. Punishment as defined
by Clutton-Brock & Parker (1995) is a behaviour
that reduces the immediate payoffs of both the actor
and its target. Punishment functions because the tar-
get’s best option is to behave more cooperatively
during future interactions, thereby avoiding further
costs, while the actor is more than compensated for
its investment through the change of the target’s
behaviour. We are not aware of an example in
which this parameter state combination (both part-
ners invest, ‘DC > CC’ for one player and ‘CC > DC’
for the other, repeated interactions, no partner
choice) applies. If one were found, punishment
would provide a partner control mechanism that
promotes stable cooperative behaviour.
Situation 2
In the second situation, we explore, both partners
would gain a higher payoff from defecting on a coop-
erative partner (both DC > CC). This situation fulfils a
critical assumption of the prisoner’s dilemma game, in
which the payoffs are constructed such that the payoff
in any single round is maximised if one defects,
irrespective of the partner’s choice of behaviour.
Step 3: Payoff Asymmetries
Highly asymmetric payoff structures cannot yield
cooperative solutions, as one player would invariably
kill its partner and the game would be over. There-
fore, only more symmetrical payoff structures, in
which cheating by one player does not cause the
death of the partner, are possible.
Step 4: n Interactions
If interactions are one-off but the payoffs are a
function of the duration of an interaction, then
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players may be able to terminate an interaction pre-
maturely if the partner cheats. Under these condi-
tions, parcelling of the exchanges and continuation
of the interaction that is contingent on the partner
delivering may promote a cooperative outcome
(Connor 1995). A good example for parcelling is
the egg trading in the hermaphroditic hamlet fish
(Fischer 1988). In principle, one player could offer
all its eggs (which are costly to produce) to the
partner for fertilisation, then the partner could
reciprocate. However, in such a sequential one-off
game, the initial investor risks that the partner will
swim off after fertilising the eggs, in search of an
individual willing to provide eggs for fertilisation in
exchange for receiving eggs for its own fertilisation.
In fact, hamlet fish do not release all eggs at once,
but rather in small parcels, with partners alternately
taking the female and the male role (Fischer 1988).
Parcelling of the eggs and alternating release trans-
forms a one-off interaction into one with iterated
decisions. Therefore, it is better to return invest-
ments to elicit further investments than to cheat
and to lose time and energy while searching for a
new partner.
Alternatively, individuals interact repeatedly, a
scenario for which we have to explore the effect of
partner choice options.
Step 5: Partner Choice Options
If there is no partner choice, then we have a combi-
nation of parameter states as in the iterated pris-
oner’s dilemma (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981): both
players invest, DC > CC applies to both players, pay-
offs are symmetrical, and interactions are iterated.
Cooperative solutions to this game structure are tra-
ditionally predicted to be tit-for-tat like: investment
by one player causes the partner to invest in return
(‘positive reciprocity’). Several cases of animal coop-
eration, including predator inspection in fishes,
blood provisioning in false vampire bats and groom-
ing in mammals, have been interpreted as tit-for-tat
like cooperation (reviewed in Dugatkin 1997). While
all these examples have been challenged (Hammer-
stein 2003), further examples have emerged more
recently (reviewed in Raihani, N. J. & Bshary, R.,
submitted). One example, pair inspections of clients
by cleaner wrasses, provides evidence that an iter-
ated prisoner’s dilemma may be solved with asym-
metric punishment rather than tit-for-tat (Bshary
et al. 2008; Raihani et al. 2010).
If there is partner choice, cheating by one player
could still lead the cheated individual to respond
with cheating or with punishment. However, now
there is also the alternative of terminating the rela-
tionship, in which case both players have to look for
a new partner. Searching and finding a new partner
probably incurs opportunity costs and search costs,
which would have to be balanced against the poten-
tial gains to be made from finding a more coopera-
tive partner. It has been argued that long-term
exchanges of services like grooming in primates are
cases of reciprocity in which cheating would lead to
partner switching (Schino & Aureli 2008). Theories
that show that the risk of losing a partner may pro-
mote cooperative behaviour (Ferrie`re et al. 2002;
McNamara et al. 2004; Foster & Wenseleers 2006;
Johnstone & Bshary 2008) need to be expanded to
specify the conditions under which switching is bet-
ter than positive or negative reciprocity and vice
versa.
Situation 3
In this situation, strategic options are asymmetric, in
that one player benefits from cheating (D > C) while
the other player lacks any option to cheat its partner
because it does not invest in the partner. For exam-
ple, when cleaner fish L. dimidiatus interact with
non-predatory clients, the cleaners still prefer client
mucus over ectoparasites (Grutter & Bshary 2003),
while non-predatory clients have no means to
exploit a cleaner fish because they do not eat small
fishes. Under these conditions, we can skip step 3
regarding payoff asymmetries of cheating, as one
player cannot cheat. To determine possible game
structures, we only need to ask whether interactions
are one-off or repeated and whether or not there is
partner choice (steps 4–5 of our decision tree).
Step 4: n Interactions
If interactions are one-off, cooperative outcomes
may still be possible if any of the three following
conditions is met. The first condition is that the pay-
offs are a function of the duration of an interaction,
and the cooperator can terminate the interaction
prematurely if the partner defects. This power to ter-
minate the interaction may suffice, in particular if
cheating does not yield much more per time unit
interaction than cooperating does (‘low temptation’
to cheat; Johnstone & Bshary 2002). Second, the
potential cheater may have to make the first move,
which may then be accepted or rejected by the part-
ner. The partner’s option to reject a bad offer is a
control mechanism that has been termed a sanction
8
(Herre et al. 1999; Kiers et al. 2003). For example,
yucca plants are pollinated by highly specialised
insects (yucca moths) that also lay eggs in the flow-
ers; the offspring of the pollinators consume some of
the developing seeds. Yuccas cannot influence how
many eggs yucca moth females lay in flowers while
pollinating. However, in some yucca species, the
plant evidently can evaluate the number of larvae in
single fruits and can selectively abort fruits in which
larvae would destroy the majority of seeds (Pellmyr
& Huth 1994). The negative effect of sanctions on
the cheating partner is a by-product of a self-serving
act: the plant aborts a heavily infested fruit if it can
shift its resources into maturing ones with more
seeds. Therefore, one could call a sanction pseudo-
punishment, so the control mechanism that stabilises
cooperative behaviour is negative pseudoreciprocity
(Bshary & Bergmu¨ller 2008). A third condition that
has been proposed to yield stable cooperation in
one-off interactions is that individuals use their cur-
rent experience for decision-making in future inter-
actions with third parties (Pfeiffer et al. 2004;
Hamilton & Taborsky 2005). In such ‘generalised
reciprocity’, an actor helps if it has received help
from any other individual in its previous interaction
in the role of a recipient, and the actor does not help
if it has not received help from any other individual.
The decision to help is thus completely independent
of the recipient’s identity and past behaviour, but
rather is based on the actor’s general experience.
While there is experimental evidence for the use of
generalised reciprocity in rats under laboratory con-
ditions (Rutte & Taborsky 2007), empiricists are
challenged to find the game structure for generalised
reciprocity in nature.
If there are potentially repeated interactions, the
question about partner choice must be addressed.
Step 5: Partner Choice
In a repeated game with asymmetric strategic
options, partner choice may promote cooperative
outcomes if the cooperator is able to choose between
(and switch) partners. If players that lack the option
to cheat can move around freely and choose with
whom they interact, they can evolve a simple strat-
egy that keeps their partners in check: ‘keep a part-
ner as long as it cooperates, and switch to a new
partner for the next round if the current one chea-
ted’. This decision rule may force chosen players to
refrain from cheating their partner simply because of
the risk of not having a partner in the next round
(Ferrie`re et al. 2002; Johnstone & Bshary 2008). In
the absence of partner choice, potential victims may
hold their partners in check if they can punish any
acts of cheating. Both cases exist in the cleaning
mutualism involving L. dimidiatus (Bshary & Grutter
2005). Non-predatory client species with access to
several cleaner territories (cleaning stations) are
likely to return to the same station for their next
inspection if the last service they received there was
of good quality, whereas they are likely to switch to
another cleaning station if the last quality of service
they received there was poor (Bshary & Scha¨ffer
2002). Resident client species, which are character-
ised by small territories ⁄home ranges and hence only
have access to the local cleaning station (without
the option to choose among cleaners), chase cleaners
if the latter cheat; cleaners respond by giving them
particularly high-quality service during the next
interaction (Bshary & Grutter 2002). Experiments
suggest that both leaving and aggression make clean-
ers behave more cooperatively (Bshary & Grutter
2005). In conclusion, negative reciprocity and part-
ner switching are partner control mechanisms that
may promote cooperative behaviour in repeated
games with asymmetric strategic options.
Introducing the Parameter ‘Communication
Networks’
All control mechanisms introduced until now rely
on personal experience of the actor with a given
partner. However, it has been proposed that as long
as interactions take place in the presence of bystand-
ers (in a communication network), these bystanders
can reach an optimal behavioural decision not only
through experience but also by gaining information
about the partner prior to interactions. It has been
proposed that observers use the information to attri-
bute an ‘image score’ (Alexander 1987; Nowak &
Sigmund 1998) or a ‘social prestige’ (Zahavi 1995;
Roberts 1998; Lotem et al. 2003) to the interacting
partners. The score is positive ⁄high if the interacting
partners cooperated and negative ⁄ low if they chea-
ted. An individual’s decision to cooperate or to cheat
will then depend on the score of its partner. If one
witnessed that the current partner cooperated with
someone else, then one may cooperate, while if the
current partner was observed cheating someone else,
then one may cheat. Under these circumstances, the
benefits of investing in an individual A are not
because of the behaviour of individual A but accrue
‘indirectly’, because of the behaviour of an observing
individual B during future interactions. If all behav-
iours classify as investments, then the concept of
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indirect reciprocity applies (Nowak & Sigmund 1998;
Leimar & Hammerstein 2001). If observers choose
cooperating individuals for self-serving reasons (i.e.,
they expect a benefit to their choice relative to other
potential partners), the concept of indirect pseudore-
ciprocity also applies (called ‘social prestige’ or ‘com-
petitive altruism’ by Zahavi 1995; Roberts 1998;
Lotem et al. 2003).
If a communication network exists and only one
player invests, the non-investing partners may use
indirect pseudoreciprocity to maximise their payoffs.
A communication network exists in the cleaning
mutualism involving L. dimidiatus, which has more
than 2000 interactions per day (Grutter 1997). Thus,
cleaners often inspect one client while another
potential client is waiting or approaching. These
bystanders apparently observe the outcome of ongo-
ing interactions, as they typically invite inspection in
the absence of conflicts but avoid the cleaner if it
cheats its current client (Bshary 2002; Bshary &
Grutter 2006). This client decision rule is self-serving
because clients simply benefit from seeking coopera-
tive cleaners and avoiding cheating cleaners. At the
same time, the decision rule sets the stage such that
cleaners benefit from giving current clients an
extraordinary quality of service if bystanders are
watching, not because the current clients will return
a benefit, but indirectly, because the bystanders will
choose to interact with the cleaners. Cleaners indeed
behave more cooperatively when observed (Bshary
2002; Bshary & Grutter 2006).
If both players invest, indirect reciprocity can sta-
bilise investments in a communication network. Evi-
dence is currently restricted to humans (Wedekind &
Milinski 2000). The classic experiment explicitly sets
up the game as one-off encounters between individ-
uals, precluding any direct reciprocity. The impor-
tance of indirect reciprocity in a repeated game
structure and in games with partner choice has not
yet been tested.
Indirect forms of cooperation based on image scor-
ing could in principle be integrated in our scheme
by introducing the sixth parameter ‘communication
network; yes or no’. However, the tree would
become very complicated. In the absence of net-
works, the solutions remain as depicted in Fig. 1. If
interactions take place in a communication network,
for every game structure, either indirect pseudoreci-
procity or indirect reciprocity becomes potential part-
ner control mechanisms, but individuals may still
alternatively use the control mechanisms depicted in
Fig. 1. The issue of competing alternative control
mechanisms will be a key topic in the discussion.
Discussion
We began with the observation that current theoret-
ical developments concerning stable cooperation are
far ahead of empirical knowledge. However, if we
ignore modelling details, there are just nine basic
game theoretical concepts and partner control mech-
anisms that may explain how stable cooperative
behaviour may be achieved. The importance of these
various concepts should depend on how often the
conditions that allow the successful use of a specific
control mechanism are found in nature. Those con-
ditions can be specified according to the course of
the interaction between partners. We therefore
attempted to characterise various game structures in
terms of unique combinations of the states of ini-
tially five parameters and went on to discuss an
extension with a sixth parameter. For each combina-
tion of parameter states, we discussed how individu-
als may prevent partners from cheating.
A key result from this exercise is that we can link
each control mechanism to a limited number of spe-
cific game structures. A more general implication is
that both empiricists and theoreticians need to inves-
tigate what ‘outside options’ an individual poten-
tially has to the observed course of action (Cant
2010): could it in principle switch partners, how
easy would that be, and how likely would it be that
a new partner behaves differently? Variation in lev-
els of cooperation typically promotes stable coopera-
tion (McNamara & Leimar 2010). Concepts are
typically studied in isolation and the conditions for
stable cooperation specified (Nowak 2006). Our
framework shows that often, several control mecha-
nisms could potentially be used in the same game.
Recently, theoreticians have started to evaluate the
conditions under which one control mechanism may
be superior over alternatives (Roberts 2008; Izquierdo
et al. 2010; Hilbe & Sigmund 2010). More such
analyses are needed to make predictions about the
empirical relevance of competing concepts. For
example, while we explained that indirect (pseudo-)
reciprocity could be used as control mechanisms in
many different game structures, empirical evidence
is currently very limited. Is this because indirect
(pseudo-) reciprocity may lose against alternative
mechanisms available for any given game structure
because of costs linked to cognitive demands (which
may even constrain its use in many species; Brosnan
et al. 2010), or have we merely overlooked these
control mechanisms until now? In favour of the latter
hypothesis, we note that there is plenty of evidence
for communication networks and eavesdropping on
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interactions at least in vertebrates in competitive
contexts (McGregor 2005). Thus, increased aware-
ness of these concepts among empiricists studying
cooperative interactions may generate more wide-
spread evidence. Similar questions arise with respect
to punishment, as this control mechanism could be
used at least in theory in several game structures
(Fig. 1), while cognitive constraints may prevent
common usage (Brosnan et al. 2010).
Conclusions
We hope that empiricists will find our framework a
useful starting point to consider game theoretical
questions in their systems, and that it may encour-
age theoreticians to explore for each game structure
the conditions that may favour one control mecha-
nism over the alternatives. Our framework joins sev-
eral recent reviews (Sachs et al. 2004; Lehmann &
Keller 2006; Bergmu¨ller et al. 2007; West et al.
2007; Bshary & Bergmu¨ller 2008; Clutton-Brock
2009; Leimar & Hammerstein 2010) that point to
the many routes apart from strategies in prisoner’s
dilemma type games to stable cooperative behaviour
between unrelated individuals. As the concepts used
in the cooperative breeding literature can be trans-
lated into the more general cooperation concepts
presented here (Bergmu¨ller et al. 2007), our scheme
is also valid for empiricists working on cooperatively
breeding species. The large variety of game struc-
tures discussed here should allow empiricists to
match their detailed observations on the natural his-
tory of their system to potential partner control
mechanisms without oversimplifying too much. Our
five parameters – investment, relative payoffs for
cooperating and defecting, payoff asymmetries
between partners, number of interactions and part-
ner choice – can be assessed in many cases, as can
the potential role of image scoring in a communica-
tion network. The parameter state combinations
yield predictions about the control mechanisms that
yield cooperative behaviour, amenable for further
testing. Empiricists should also be aware that several
game structures may occur within their study sys-
tem, and hence several control mechanisms may be
used, as is the case in marine cleaning mutualism
(Bshary 2010). Also, the temptation to cheat may
vary from one situation to the next, depending for
example on whether future interactions are expected
to be frequent or infrequent (Oates et al. 2010).
Thus, our dichotomous approach is a simplification,
but we believe it provides a valid starting point.
With more empirical studies on game theory, we
can both refine the framework presented here and
build a data set that will eventually reveal the rela-
tive importance of the various concepts for coopera-
tive behaviour in nature.
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